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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shernor A. Williams appeals from the district court's decision affirming the 
magistrate's judgment of conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding Williams 
guilty of misdemeanor driving without privileges. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On February 15, 2013 Officer Bateman, while driving on Overland Road, 
observed the male driver of a gray 2004 Volkswagen Jetta continually glancing at 
Officer Bateman in the review mirror. (7/25/13 Tr. p. 4, L. 23 - p. 6, L. 18.) The 
Jetta was driving in the right lane and Officer Bateman was in the left lane. 
(7/25/13 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 2-10.) 
Officer Bateman ran the license plate through a records check. (7/25/13 
Tr., p. 6, L. 19 - p. 7, L. 4.) The records check revealed the owner of the Jetta 
was Shernor A. Williams ("Williams"). (Id.) The records check showed Williams' 
driving privileges were suspended. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12 - p. 12, L. 9.) 
Officer Bateman pulled up a photo of Williams on the computer mounted directly 
in front of him. (Id.) 
Officer Bateman then drove up next to the Jetta and looked at its male 
driver. (7 /25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12 - p. 12, L. 9.) The driver then looked at Officer 
Bateman. (Id.) Officer Bateman drove next to the Jetta until he was able to 
confirm that it was Williams. (Id., see also Tr., p. 13, L. 6-13.) During this time, 
Officer Bateman had a clear view of Williams driving the Jetta. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 
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12, Ls. 10-18.) Officer Bateman's passenger window was down and William's 
driver's side window was clear. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 19, L. 12 - p. 20, L. 20.) It took 
Officer Bateman roughly six to seven seconds to confirm that the driver of the 
Jetta was Williams. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12-p. 12, L. 9.) 
When Officer Bateman began to slow down to get behind Williams, 
Williams slowed down at the same speed, preventing Officer Bateman from 
getting behind him. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 13, L. 6 - p. 14, L. 6.) Officer Bateman 
slowed down to 20 mph, but Williams continued to slow down at the same rate. 
(Id.) Officer Bateman explained: 
It was obvious to me he didn't want me to get behind him. 
Wouldn't look over at me. I could see out of the corner of his eye, 
kind of, looking to see the position of my vehicle was. Without 
stopping in the roadway I wasn't going to be able to get behind his 
car. 
(7/25/13 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 1-6.) Williams and Officer Bateman slowed down almost 
to a stop. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 4-8.) 
Williams then made a quick right turn into the Sagecrest Apartments, and 
Officer Bateman was unable to safely follow him. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 7-17.) 
Officer Bateman continued to the next turn and tried to find Williams, but he was 
unsuccessful. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 14, L. 18- p. 15, L. 4.) 
Officer Bateman then attempted to find Williams at the address listed on 
his motor vehicle report. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 15, L. 15 - p. 16, L. 13; Ex. 1.) 
However, Williams no longer lived at that address. (Id.) The apartment manager 
provided Officer Bateman with Williams' cell phone number and Officer Bateman 
called Williams the next day. (Id.) 
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When Officer Bateman asked Williams whether he had been driving the 
day before, Williams paused for a long time then said he did not remember. 
(7/25/13 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 18-25.) Officer Bateman arranged to meet Williams at 
Idaho State Police Headquarters parking lot that same day. (7 /25/13 Tr., p. 16, 
L. 3 - p. 17, L. 25.) 
When they met at the parking lot, Officer Bateman again confirmed that 
Williams was the same person who he saw driving the gray 2004 Volkswagen 
Jetta the day before. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 16, L. 3 - p. 17, L. 25.) During their 
conversation, Williams admitted that his license had been suspended but he 
thought it was taken care of. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 1-17.) Williams was 
charged with Driving without Privileges. (R., p. 5.) 
Officer Bateman and Dorrine O'Neil, a records keeper from the Idaho 
Transportation Department, testified at trial. Ms. O'Neil testified that Williams' 
driver's license was suspended on February 15, 2013. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 25, L. 15 
- p. 26, L. 24.) The state also introduced the Idaho Transportation Department 
Motor Vehicle record report which showed Williams as the owner of the gray 
2004 Volkswagen Jetta. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 9, L. 24 - p. 10, L. 3; Ex. 1.) 
Williams testified in his own defense and denied that he was driving on 
February 15, 2013. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 19-23.) Williams admitted that he 
owned a gray 2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 19-21.) 
Williams admitted that his license suspension went into effect on December 14, 
2012. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 22-25.) 
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The jury found Williams guilty of Driving Without Privileges. (R., p. 42.) 
Williams appealed his conviction to the district court. (R., pp. 71-73.) The district 
court affirmed Williams' conviction for Driving Without Privileges. (R., pp. 138-
145.) It first found that Williams had not objected to the introduction of Officer 
Bateman's identification of Williams and failed to argue that this identification 
constituted fundamental error on intermediate appeal. (R., pp. 141-142.) The 
district court also determined there was sufficient evidence to find that Williams 
was driving the 2004 Volkswagen Jetta. (R., pp. 142-143.) Finally, the district 
court rejected Williams' argument that there was insufficient evidence that he 
knew his license was suspended. (R., p. 143.) Williams filed a timely appeal 
from the decision of the district court affirming the jury verdict in the magistrate 
court. (R., pp. 146-148.) 
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ISSUES 
Williams states the issues on appeal as: 
Whether permitting Officer Bateman to identify Mr. Williams in court 
and testify to his out-of-court identification constitutes a 
fundamental error? 
Whether the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to establish the 
identity of the driver observed by Officer Bateman on February 15, 
2013? 
Whether the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to establish that 
Mr. Williams had knowledge of his license suspension in effect on 
February 15, 2013? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 2.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Williams failed to show fundamental error entitling him to appellate 
review of his unpreserved claim that Officer Bateman's identification of Williams 
violated his due process rights? 
2. Has Williams failed to show the district court erred in concluding there was 





Williams Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error Entitling Him To 
Appellate Review Of His Unpreserved Claim Of A Due Process Violation 
A. Introduction 
Officer Bateman testified that he drove next to a 2004 gray Volkswagen 
Jetta until he confirmed the driver was Williams. (7 /25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12 - p. 
12, L. 9.) At trial, Williams did not object to Officer Bateman's testimony 
identifying him as the driver. (See 7/25/13 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 12-25, p. 17, Ls. 7-25.) 
Nor did Williams move to suppress Officer Bateman's testimony. On appeal, 
Williams has failed to show the admission of Officer Bateman's testimony was 
fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." lg. 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." lg. (citing Losser, 145 
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Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981)). 
C. Williams Does Not Challenge The District Court's Ruling That He 
Abandoned The Due Process Claim On Intermediate Appeal And 
Therefore The Appellate Court Should Affirm On This Unchallenged Basis 
The district court held that Williams failed to pursue the due process claim 
on intermediate appeal and thus abandoned it. (R., pp. 141-142.) 
Mr. Williams did not object to [Officer Bateman's identification] 
testimony on the basis that it was unreliable and, therefore, violated 
his due process rights in having it introduced. See State v. Lenon, 
143 Idaho 415, 417, 146 P.3d 681, 683 (Ct. App. 2006) ("In 
general, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives 
that issues for purposes of appeal. However, in the case of 
fundamental error, we may consider the issue even though no 
objection was made at time of trial. .. ") 
Mr. Williams has neither acknowledged that this issue was not 
raised before the magistrate nor argued that it constituted 
fundamental error for this identification to have been admitted. See 
Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) 
("The argument shall contain the [party's] contentions with respect 
to the issues presented ... the reasons therefor, with citations to 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied 
upon."); I.AR. 35(a)(6); City of Boise v. Bench Sewer District, 116 
Idaho 25, 26 n. 1, 773 P.2d 642, 643 n. 1 (1988) (issue not fully 
briefed or argued is deemed abandoned). 
(Id.) On appeal to this Court, Williams does not challenge this ruling. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 2-8.) Instead, Williams jumps straight to an argument 
regarding the merits of his due process claim. (Id.) When the basis for a trial 
court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, an appellate court will affirm on the 
unchallenged basis. See State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d 
1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998). Here, Williams does not challenge the district 
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court's determination that he abandoned his due process claim and the district 
court's ruling on the due process claims should be affirmed on this basis. 
D. Even If This Court Considers Williams Due Process Claim, It Fails 
Because Williams Did Not Assert A Due Process Violation At Trial And He 
Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error On Appeal 
At trial, Williams did not move to suppress or object to Officer Bateman's 
testimony identifying him as the driver of 2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta. It is well-
settled that "Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for 
appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 
125, 129 (1995)). An exception to this rule exists if the alleged error constitutes 
fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. However, the 
burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the defendant 
asserting the error for the first time on appeal. Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. To 
carry that burden, a defendant asserting an unpreserved error must demonstrate 
that the error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Id. 
1. Williams' Constitutional Rights Were Not Implicated When Officer 
Bateman Compared A Photograph Of Williams To Williams' Face 
While Williams Was Committing The Crime 
Williams fails the first prong of the fundamental error test because Officer 
Bateman did not violate or even implicate Williams' constitutional due process 
rights by comparing Williams' face to a photograph of Williams during the 
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commission of the crime. "[T]he due process test for suppression of an in-court 
identification that is allegedly tainted by an impermissibly suggestive out-of-court 
identification is whether the out-of-court identification was so suggestive that 
there is a very substantial likelihood of misidentification." State v. Hoisington, 104 
Idaho 153, 161, 657 P.2d 17, 25 (1983) (citing State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 
103,577 P.2d 1135, 1151 (1978)). Idaho uses a two stage inquiry to determine 
whether an out-of-court identification violates due process. See State v. Alger, 
115 Idaho 42, 44-45, 764 P.2d 119, 121-122 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1988). To suppress 
an in-court identification the appellant must show that the out-of-court 
identification was obtained "as a result of confrontations 'so unnecessarily 
suggestive' that they are 'conducive to irreparable mistaken identification."' Id., 
at 44,764 P.2d at 121 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972); Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967)). Evidence of the out-of-court identification 
is suppressed under the same standard, save the mistaken identification is not 
irreparable. Alger, 115 Idaho at 44, 764 P.2d at 121. Second, the Idaho Courts 
will look at whether, under the totality of the circumstances, an identification was 
reliable even though the identification procedure was suggestive. kl,., at 45, 764 
P.2d at 122 n. 2. 
First, Williams failed to show that his due process rights are even 
implicated by Officer Bateman's conduct. This case is significantly different than 
the identification cases cited by Williams. See Appellant's brief, pp. 3-6 (citing 
Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 657 P.2d 17; State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 301 
P.3d 242 (2013)). Unlike the cases cited by Williams, there was no 
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"confrontation." Officer Bateman did not take a photograph of Williams to a third 
person or prepare a photo lineup for a third party witness at some point after the 
crim. Officer Bateman compared Williams' face to the photo on his computer 
while the crime was ongoing. This is no different than a police officer identifying 
a suspect based upon a driver's license photograph or a booking photo. See ~ 
State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 88 P.3d 1226 (Ct. App. 2004) (officer 
compared face of suspect to face on driver's license photograph to identify 
suspect); State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 730-731, 24 P.3d 44, 47-47 (2001) 
(deputy used booking photo to positively identify suspect). Williams' appeal fails 
to implicate any due process rights. This is not a tainted lineup presented to a 
witness after a crime, but is an officer identifying the suspect during the 
commission of the crime. 
Williams fails to cite a single case where an officer's comparison of a 
suspect to a photograph, during the commission of the crime is suggestive, much 
less implicates the suspect's due process rights. Because Williams is not 
seeking to suppress a subsequent identification by a third party, but is instead 
seeking to exclude what Officer Bateman observed as an eye-witness to the 
crime, Williams has failed to show his due process rights were even implicated, 
let alone violated by a impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification. 
Second, under the totality of the circumstance the identification was 
reliable. "Factors to be considered under the totality of circumstances test in 
determining whether an identification is reliable include (1) the opportunity of the 
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness's degree of 
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attention, (3) the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of 
certainty demonstrated at the identification, and (5) the length of time between 
the crime and the identification." Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 162, 657 P.2d at 26 
(citing Manson v. Brathwaite. 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), 
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)). The 
application of these factors highlight the reliability of Officer Bateman's 
identification. 
Officer Bateman had a good opportunity to view Williams at the time of the 
crime. Officer Bateman drove next to the 2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta until he 
was able to confirm Williams was the driver. (7 /25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12 - p. 12, L. 
9.) Officer Bateman had a clear view of Williams. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 10-18.) 
Officer Bateman's passenger window was down and William's driver's side 
window was clear. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 19, L. 12 - p. 20, L. 13.) It took Officer 
Bateman roughly six to seven seconds to confirm that the driver of the gray 2004 
Volkswagen Jetta was Williams. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12 - p. 12, L. 9.) Only 
after Officer Bateman confirmed Williams' identification did Officer Bateman 
attempt to make a traffic stop. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 13 Ls. 6-17.) There was no 
evidence that Officer Bateman needed additional time to identify Williams. 
Officer Bateman had a very high degree of attention. Officer Bateman 
was specifically looking at Williams and comparing him with the picture on 
dashboard computer. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 21-24.) Officer Bateman testified 
that he was "primarily looking to see who the person driving the vehicle was. 
That was my main reason to be beside this car." (Id.) 
11 
The third factor also weighs in the State's favor because Officer Bateman 
did not identify Williams by looking at a picture or seeing a person that matched 
the perpetrator's description. Rather, he made a comparison of Williams' face to 
the photograph of Williams while Williams was committing the crime. Because 
no prior description played any role and instead it was a simultaneous 
identification it was highly reliable. 
Officer Bateman had a high level of certainty in the identification: 
Q. And your testimony is that you're sure that Mr. Williams is 
the guy that you saw on that day? 
A. If I wasn't 100 percent sure I would have never thought 
about trying to stop the vehicle, let alone write a citation for it. 
(7/25/13 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-15.) 
Finally, there was also no time between the crime and the identification. 
The identification was contemporaneous with the crime. Considering the totality 
of the circumstances and the five factors, the identification was reliable. 
2. The Error Did Not Plainly Exist 
Williams fails to meet his burden of showing that the error plainly exists 
without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate 
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
Williams' trial counsel did not object or seek to suppress Officer 
Bateman's testimony identifying Williams as the driver. (See 7/25/13 Tr., p. 12, 
Ls. 12-25, p. 17, Ls. 10-25.) Instead, Williams' trial counsel cross examined 
Officer Bateman regarding the accuracy of his identification. (See 7/25/13 Tr., p. 
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19, L. 6 - 24, L. 16.) Williams' trial counsel asked whether Officer Bateman's 
view was obstructed, whether Officer Bateman remembered the driver's clothes, 
the length of time Officer Bateman had to view the driver, whether Officer 
Bateman's attention was divided, and whether Officer Bateman could remember 
this incident among the hundreds of traffic stops he conducted. (Id.) Williams' 
trial counsel made the tactical decision not to object or move to suppress Officer 
Bateman's testimony and to instead attack Officer Bateman's identification on 
cross examination. 
Williams also fails to show that the error was legally "plain." Williams does 
not cite to a single case where a police officer identifying the suspect during the 
commission of the crime constituted a due process violation. It was not plain 
error to permit Officer Bateman to testify regarding the identification of Williams. 
Williams has failed to show fundamental error and the district court and 
jury verdict are properly affirmed. 1 
11. 
Williams Has Failed To Show The Evidence Was Not Sufficient To Support His 
Conviction For Driving Without Privileges 
A. Introduction 
On appeal Williams argues there was no substantial competent evidence 
establishing Williams was the driver and Williams knew his license was 
suspended. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-13.) Williams' arguments fail. 
1 Williams has also failed to show prejudice because he has failed to show Officer 
Bateman's testimony regarding his identification of Williams as the driver of the 
2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta violated his due process rights. 
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There was substantial competent evidence to support the jury finding that 
Williams was the driver of the 2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta because Officer 
Bateman positively identified Williams and the 2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta is 
registered to Williams. 
There was also substantial competent evidence to support the jury finding 
that Williams knew or reasonably should have known his driver's license was 
suspended on February 15, 2013 because Williams admitted he knew his license 
suspension went into effect on December 14, 2012 and his conduct and 
testimony provide the reasonable inference that he knew it was still suspended 
on February 15, 2013. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting 
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to 
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 
Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at 
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 
14 
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d 
at 1072. 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove Williams Was The 
Driver of the 2004 Gray Volkswagen Jetta 
The state presented substantial evidence that Williams was the driver of 
the 2004 Gray Volkswagen Jetta. Officer Bateman testified that he had a clear 
view of the driver. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 10-18.) The driver of the 2004 
Volkswagen looked at Officer Bateman. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 19-p. 12, L. 9.) 
Officer Bateman testified that drove next to the 2004 Volkswagen until he was 
able to confirm that Williams was the driver. (Id.; see also 7/25/13 Tr., p. 13, L. 
6-13.) Officer Bateman testified he was 100 percent sure that Williams was the 
driver. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-15.) The state introduced evidence that 
Williams was the owner of 2004 Gray Volkswagen Jetta. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 6, L. 19 
- p. 10, L. 20; Ex. 1.) Williams confirmed that he was the owner of a gray 2004 
Volkswagen Jetta. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 19-21.) Williams did not provide any 
testimony who else was driving his car on February 15, 2013. There are 
substantial facts and the inferences drawn from those facts to support the jury 
finding Williams was the driver. 
D. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove Williams Knew Or 
Should Have Known His License Was Suspended 
The jury found that Williams knew or should have known his license was 
suspended when Officer Bateman saw him driving. Williams argues there was 
no substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found that 
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Williams knew his license was suspended on February 15, 2013. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 11 13.) 
The jury instruction explained how a jury can find a defendant knew their 
driving privileges are revoked, disqualified or suspended. (R., p. 61.) 
A person has knowledge that the person's license, driving privileges 
or permit to drive is revoked, disqualified or suspended when: 
(a) the person has actual knowledge of the revocation, 
disqualification or suspension of the person's license, driving 
privileges or permit to drive; or 
(b) the person has received oral or written notice from a verified, 
authorized source that the person's license, driving privileges or 
permit to drive was revoked, disqualified or suspended; or 
(c) Notice of the suspension, disqualification or revocation of his 
license, driving privileges or permit to drive was mailed by first class 
mail to his address pursuant to section 49-320, Idaho Code, as 
shown in the transportation department records, and he failed to 
receive the notice or learn of its contents as a result of his own 
unreasonable, intentional or negligent conduct or his failure to keep 
the transportation department apprised of his mailing address as 
required by section 49-320, Idaho Code; or 
(d) the person has knowledge of, or a reasonable person in the 
person's situation exercising reasonable diligence would have 
knowledge of, the existence of facts or circumstances which, under 
Idaho law, might have caused the revocation, disqualification or 
suspension of the person's license, driving privileges or permit to 
drive. 
(R., p. 61; see also I.C. § 18-8001(2).) The state provided evidence that Williams 
had knowledge of his license suspension. Williams testified that he knew his 
license suspension went into effect on December 14, 2012. (7/25/13 Tr., p., 34, 
Ls. 22-25.) Ms. O'Neil, a records keeper for the Idaho Transportation 
Department, testified that Williams' license was suspended on February 15, 
2013. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 25, L. 15 - p. 26, L. 24.) At no point did Williams testify 
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that he believed he had driving privileges on the day in question. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 
30, L. 9 - p. 35, L. 19.) Officer Bateman testified that Williams told the officer he 
knew his license was suspended but that "He thought it had been taken care of." 
(7/25/13 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 12-17.) Williams testified he had not been driving to 
school, but had been "catching taxis and having friends drop me off." (7/25/13 
Tr., p. 32, Ls. 3-24.) Williams' driving behavior also supports the jury verdict that 
Williams knew his license was suspended. When Officer Bateman saw Williams 
driving, Williams was "continually looking in the rearview mirror, glancing, very 
rigid, ten and two posture." (7/25/13 Tr. p. 6, Ls. 11-18.) Williams also took 
action to avoid being pulled over by Officer Bateman. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 13, L. 6 -
14, L. 6.) 
When I began to do that I put my [back] flashers on to warn 
traffic behind me that I was going to be slowing down so I didn't get 
rear-ended. Didn't cause a traffic accident or anything like that. 
When I did that cars behind me, obviously, started slowing down. I 
got all the way down to about 20 miles-an-hour and Mr. Williams 
also slowed down right with me. 
It was obvious to me he didn't want me to get behind him. 
Wouldn't look over at me. I could see out of the corner of his eye, 
kind of, looking to see the position of my vehicle was. Without 
stopping in the roadway I wasn't going to be able to get behind his 
car. 
(Tr., p. 13, L. 6 - 14, L. 6.) The jury could reasonable infer from the evidence 
presented that Williams knew his driving privileges were suspended and did not 
actually or reasonably believe they had been reinstated. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Williams' conviction of 
misdemeanor Driving Without Privileges. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2014. 
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